Fidelis: Verifiable Keyword Search with No Trust Assumption.

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Dependency on Cloud Computing and Storage Services





Small and Medium Enterprises

- SME using Cloud Computing for Cost & Security effectiveness
- Easier to process requests and Faster to respond
- Data survivable probability Increases





Google Cloud





Google Drive

Introduction and Motivation Why Searchable Encryption?

Can we TRUST Cloud Service Providers?

TRUST?

Sell Data

Hacked











Manipulation







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Queryable Encryption

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Introduction and Motivation Why Searchable Encryption?

How to be SAFE? Trivial Solution



 $\mathsf{Download} \text{ all data} \to \mathsf{Decrypt} \to \mathsf{Search} \to \mathsf{Re}\text{-}\mathsf{encrypt} \to \mathsf{Upload}$



Queryable Encryption

What we Need \rightarrow Ability to Query

1. Encrypt Data



2. Send Encrypted Data



3. Store in cloud







Query Trapdoor





over Encrypted Data

6.User received



Result/Response



Fidelis

System Model



Figure: System Model

- **Owner**: The owner of the database. Multiple owner can exists.
- ② **User**: The users of the database. Sometimes owner is the only user.
- **Cloud**: The storage and computation service provider.

Query: Given a keyword, return all files that contains the keyword.

Fidelis

What if the Cloud become Malicious?



Then, the Cloud can

- send random result, without searching.
- Intentionally can send manipulated result

Solution?

- Numerous solution exists.
- Results from malicious cloud can be verified by anyone, including honest client



What if the Clients become Malicious too?



- Then, the Client can
 - falsely claim incorrectness
 - avoid service fee

Solution? Consensus based protocol

- Most considers users malicious but owner trusted
- Guo et al. [1] Gave a solution but require O(DB) storage in Blockchain



Fidelis

Our Contribution

We provided a blockchain based solution addressing above issues



- Owner sends digest of valid keywords to blockchain
- Prom start to end of a search, blockchain is used

Our proposed scheme | Fidelis



- In Enable searching when all parties are malicious
- For every search, it requires only constant costs due to smart contract





Experimental Evaluation

We implement and evaluate the protocol w.r.t. **Ethereum** and smart contracts deployed in Ropsten test network.



a. Owner's b. User and Server's Computation Time during initialization

• On a existing keyword Searching: SendCommitment takes 16s & costs is 9.5 USD same as StoreandLock. However, Reveal, takes 21s, & 10.0 USD and payment finalization takes 18s & costs 2.8 USD.

• On a non-existing keyword Searching: QueryValid execution time taken varies between 20s and 34s whereas gas cost varies from 41.3 to 43.5 USD.

These \implies Fidelis is *practical*, *efficient* and *scalable*.



References:

[1] Guo, Y., Zhang, C., and Jia, X. *Towards public verifiable and forward-privacy encrypted search by using blockchain*. IEEE TDSC. 2022

[2] Jiang, S., Liu, J., Wang, L., and Yoo, S. Verifiable search meets blockchain: A privacy-preserving framework for outsourced encrypted data, IEEE ICC 2019.









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${\sf Questions?}$





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